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erts, and to be prepared for the developments of Texas Gulf.22 Sim-

ilarly, others feel that the issues involved in Texas Gulf constitute "no
radical departure from the pre-existing rules" and that "[t]he general rules implicit in that case have been operative for a very long
time." 23 Still another view is that the SEC's success in prosecuting
Texas Gulf is a significant change, which will "impose more stringent
disclosure and trading requirements on both issuers and those with access to corporate information unavailable to the public." 24 Finally, the
more moderate (and probably most accurate) opinion is that, while
the TGS proceeding is significant, it does not place unreasonable restraints on trading by insiders, for it has long been difficult to justify
such trading as is proscribed by the Texas Gulf holding.2s
In sum, the court of appeals' holding in SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur
has clarified the possible liability of a corporate officer or employee in
trading in his corporation's securities on the basis of undisclosed inside
information under rule 10b-5 and, in so doing, has extended such liability to certain persons and certain situations not heretofore clearly
included. The resulting extension of liability is, however, not unreasonable.
DENNIS C. HENSLEY
Real Property-CONDOMINIUMS-MERGER OF ESTATES. Kauaian Development Co., after acquiring a leaseholding interest in land, executed
numerous documents with individual purchasers for the sale of condominium units.' Once the corporation submitted the lease to a "horizontal property regime" (the condominium), 2 the fee to the property
non-officer employees were held liable, but the district court in so holding relied on
the district court holding in Texas Gulf. See id. at 409.
22. Cary, supra note 17, at 1011.
23. Fleischer, Insider Trading in Stocks, 21 Bus. LAw. 1009, 1020 (1966). It should
be noted that Mr. Fleischer's statement was made before the Texas Gulf holding under
discussion here was rendered and was made only on the basis of the issues raised
by the proceeding.
24. Kennedy and Wander, supra note 20, at 1058.
25. Fleischer, supranote 12, at 1304-05.
1. State Savings & Loan Ass'n v. Kauaian Development Co., 445 P. 2d 109 (Hawaii
1968). An "agreement of sale" normally denotes a transaction whereby the purchaser
is entitled to immediate possession; however, in this case the right to possession was
not to arise until completion of the construction.
2. The statutory requirements necessary to the creation of a condominium in
Hawaii are found in S. L. H. Act. 9, § 8 (1962).

This section reads as follows:

A horizontal property regime is created under the Horizontal Property
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was conveyed to the corporation.3 Subsequently the plaintiff-mortgagee
financed the construction of the condominium but took the mortgage
with knowledge of the purchase contracts. Upon default of the mortgage by the corporation, the mortgagee instituted this action to foreclose against the interest of the purchasers of individual condominium
units.

4

The trial court, adhering to strict common-law principles, held that
the horizontal property regime was destroyed when the leasehold
merged in the fee.5 Since the executory purchase contracts could no
longer be enforced, they failed to convey any interest in realty and
consequently, foreclosure had to be effectuated.
The Supreme Court of Hawaii, in reversing the lower court's decision, held- that a contract purchaser of an individual unit in a condominium has, absent subordination,6 priority over a subsequent mortgagee who finances the construction and who takes the mortgage with
knowledge of the purchase contracts. In buttressing its decision, the
court rejected the common-law principle that merger of estates would
occur despite the intervention of contract rights of innocent third perRegime Act when a developer, sole owner, or co-owners declare their intention to do so by recording a master lease or deed and a declaration
of submission which contains the following:
a. The description of the land, whether leased or in fee simple, and the
buildings, expressing their respective areas;
b. The general description and number of each apartment, expressing
its area, location and any other data necessary for its identification;
and
c. The description of the general common elements of the building.
3. HAWAII REvasED LAws § 170A44 (1955) provides in part:
The developer shall not enter into a building contract or agreement for the
sale of any unit in a condominium project until
a. A true copy of the commissioners final or substitute public report,
there on with all supplementary public reports, if any has been issued,
has been given to the prospective purchaser.
b. The latter has been given an opportunity to read same, and,
c. His receipt taken therefore.
4. State Savings & Loan Ass'n v. Kauaian Development Co., 445 P. 2d 109 (Hawaii
1968).
5. The common law doctrine of the merger of estates already has been recognized in
Hawaii; however, the doctrine's prior recognition did not involve the intervening rights
of innocent third parties. Foster v. Waiahole Water Co., 25 Hawaii 726, 733 (1921);
Simerson v. Simerson, 20 Hawaii 57, 59 (1910).
6. A contract purchaser of an individual condominium unit with interests superior to
a subsequent mortgage may voluntarily subordinate his interests to that mortgage.
State Savings & Loan Ass'n v. Kauaian Development Co., 445 P. 2d 109, 119 (Hawaii
1968).
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sons. In an effort to encourage the development of condominium
projects, the Hawaii Supreme Court concluded that the corporate lease
continued as an estate distinct from the land company's interest in the
fee; therefore, the interest in realty from which the purchasers' rights
7
originated remained intact.
Condominiums or horizontal property regimes have recently emerged
through enabling statutory enactment 8 and, because of post-Wrorld
War II housing shortages, interest in condominium ownership has increased substantially.' Basic legal theory states that the property interests involved in a condominium project may be defined as a "system of separate ownership of individual units in multi-unit buildings." 10
Thus, individual condominium units are legal entities equivalent to
dwellings built as individual structures," except that each separate
owner has a non-severable interest as a tenant in common with the
other owners in such common elements as building entrances, stairways and halls.' 2
In this case, State Savings & Loan Association v. Kauaian Development Co.,'1 the Hawaii Supreme Court rejected the common-law doctrine of merger of estates upon the theory that property rights of the
unit owners in a condominium complex should be well protected. At
common law the doctrine of merger was an established, inflexible rule.
For example, whenever a greater and a lesser estate met in the same
person without an intermediate estate, the lesser estate was immediately
destroyed,' 4 irrespective of the manifest intention of the parties. 1" In
7. Id. The court also held that it would apply the old law on mechanics' and materialmen's liens to condominiums; therefore, such liens would attach to the equitable interest
of the unit owners in the condominium.
8. Hawaii was the first state to enact horizontal property regime legislation. Kerr,
Condominium-Statutory Implementation, 38 ST. JoHNs L. Rzv. 1, 5 (1963).
9. Another reason for the increased interest in condominium ownership is the National
Housing Act § 234, 12 U. S. C. § 1715Y (Supp. IV 1963), which includes condominium
apartments as an acceptable form of ownership prerequisite for a Federal Housing Administration mortgage loan.
10. ROHAN & REsKINS, ComOMINIUM LAW A"m PRAGtIC, § 1.01[1] (1965).
11. State Savings & Loan Ass'n v. Kauaian Development Co., 445 P. 2d 109 (Hawaii
1968).
12. Bergin, Virginia's Horizontal Property Act: An Introduwtory Analysis, 52 VA.
L. Rzv. 961, 963-64 (1966).

13. 445 P.2d 109, 120 (Hawaii 1968).
14. Wilson v. Kipp, 94 Cal. App.2d 426, 210 P.2d 908 (1949); Alderman v. Whidden,
142 Fla. 647, 195 So. 605 (1940); Foster v. Waiahole Water Co., 25 Hawaii 726, 733
(1921); Johnston v. Masterson, 397 II. 168, 73 N.E.2d 401 (1947); H. C. Frick Co. v.
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order for a merger of legal and equitable estates to take place, however, the estates must be coextensive and commensurate; that is, the
estates must be both legal or both equitable. 6 Applying these commonlaw principles to the present case, there is no doubt that a merger at
law would occur, destroying the interests of the purchasers in the
condominium leasehold.' 7
The modern doctrine, however, is that merger is not favored and
that equity will prevent or permit a merger depending upon the intent of the parties,' 8 whether expressed or implied, 0 and the facts and
circumstances attending the transfer in realty.2 ° A few courts have gone
further by holding that the intention of the parties will not necessarily
control the merger of estates when the rights of third persons intervene, 2 ' and that a merger will be prevented where such rights would
otherwise be prejudiced. 2
The significance of State Savings & Loan Association23 lies in the
extention, by the Hawaii Supreme Court, of the protection equity historically has given to rights arising under an executory contract for the
sale of land to interests of contract purchasers of individual units in
Laugheed, 203 Pa. 168, 52 A. 172 (1902); Mobley v. Harkins, 14 Wash.2d 276, 128 P.2d
289 (1942).
15. E.g., Mobley v. Harkins, 14 Wash.2d 276, 128 P.2d 298 (1942).

16. E.g, Donalds v. Plumb, 8 Conn. 447 (1831); In re Dickson's Estate, 378 Pa. 48, 105
A.2d 156 (1954); Bowlin v. Rhode Island Hospital Trust Co, 31 R. 1. 289, 76 A. 348
(1910); Hilmes v. Moon, 168 Wash. 222, 11 P.2d 253 (1932).

17. State Savings & Loan Ass'n v. Kauaian Development Co., 445 P.2d 109 (Hawaii
1968).
18. E.g., Sisson v. Swift, 243 Ala. 289, 9 So.2d 891 (1942); Bagley v. McCarthy Bros.

Co., 95 Minn. 286, 104 N.W. 7 (1905); Dunkrum v. Maceck Bldg. Corp., 256 N.Y. 275,
176 N.E. 392 (1931).

19. Polk Bond & Mortgage Co. v. Dwiggins, 109 Fla. 443, 147 So. 855 (1933); Dilts
v. Brooks, 66 Mont. 346, 213 P. 600 (1923); Barry Inc. v. Baf, Ltd., 3 N.J. Super. 355, 65
A.2d 761 (1949).
20. E.g., Anderson v. Starr, 159 Wash. 641, 294 P. 581 (1930).
21. St. Louis Union Trust Co. v. Jolliffe, 74 F.2d 247 (C.A.N.Y. 1934); Weisser's

Trustee v. Mulloy, 276 Ky. 427, 124 S.W.2d 496 (1939). In the former case it was held
that where a lessor conveys his reversionary interest to the lessee, merger results and
rents cease; however, where the lessor mortgages the reversion prior to its conveyance
to the lessee, a merger will not occur in order that the rights of the mortgagee are
not prejudiced.
22. E.g., Beauchamp v. Bertig, 90 Ark. 351, 119 S.W. 75 (1909); Frasier v. Martin,
195 Ga. 683, 25 S.E.2d 307 (1943); Fortman v. Deters, 206 III. 159, 69 N.E. 97 (1903);
Wetdaufer v. Ames, 133 Mich. 201, 94 N.W. 950 (1903); Curtis v. Moore, 152 N.Y. 159,
46 N.E. 168 (1897); Waldron v. Wahl, 286 Pa. 237, 133 A. 252 (1926).

23. State Savings & Loan Ass'n v. Kauaian Development Co, 445 P.2d 109 (Hawaii
1968).
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a proposal condominium complex. In protecting the contract purchasers, the court has implemented judicially the legislative desire to encourage the development of condominium projects and, in the same
instance, has formulated a progressive standard of statutory construction in an area of law which has profound social and economic implications.
CHARLES F. MIDKIFF
Torts-EMOTIONAL DAMAGE-"ZONE OF DANGER" TEST REJECTED.

Plaintiffs, mother and daughter, brought an action to recover for emotional shock and resulting physical injury occasioned by witnessing the
death of a second daughter caused by the negligence of the defendant
motorist.' The lower court denied defendant's motion for summary
judgment as to the plaintiff-daughter who was within the zone of
danger, but granted summary judgment against the plaintiff-mother
who witnessed the accident while outside the zone of danger.
The Supreme Court of California reversed the superior court in part
and awarded recovery to the plaintiff-mother. In overruling the previously controlling California case of Amaya v. Home Ice, Fuel and
Supply Co.,2 the court based its decision on the ". . . hopeless artificiality of the zone-of-danger rule" 3 and on the leading English case

on this subject, Hambrook v. Stokes Bros.,' which allowed recovery
in analogous circumstances.
Recovery in actions for emotional shock and resulting physical injury due to witnessing the peril, injury, or death of a third person has
generally been denied to bystanders, parents," spouses,7 or children.8
1. Dillon v. Legg, -- Cal.2d 441 P.2d 912, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72 (1968).
2. 59 Cal.2d 295, 379 P.2d 513, 29 Cal. Rptr. 33 (1963).
3. Dillon v. Legg, Cal.2d 441 P.2d 912, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72 (1968).
4. 1 K.B. 141 (1925).
5. See, Angst v. Great Northern Ry. Co., 131 F. Supp. 156 (D. Minn. 1955); Van
Hoy v. Oklahoma Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 205 Okla. 135, 235 P.2d 948 (1951); McMahon
v. Bergeson, 9 Wis.2d 256, 101 N.W.2d 63 (1960).
6. See, e.g.. Mahaffey v. Official Detective Stories, Inc., 210 F. Supp. 215 (W.D. La.
1962); Rogers v. Hexol, Inc., 218 F. Supp. 453 (D. Ore. 1962); Preece v.'Baur, 143
F. Supp. 804 (E.D. Idaho 1956); Southern Ry. Co. v. Jackson, 146 Ga. 243, 91 S.E. 28
(1916); Hayward v. Yost, 72 Idaho 415, 242 P.2d 971 (1952); Cleveland, C.C. & St. L. Ry.
Co. v. Steward, 24 Ind. App. 374, 56 N.E. 917 (1900); Vinet v. Checker Cab Co, 140
So.2d 252 (La. App. Ct. 1962); Herrick v. Evening Express Pub. Co., 120 Me. 138, 113
A. 16 (1921); Cote v. Litawa, 96 N.H. 174, 71 A.2d 792 (1950); Brennan v. Biber, 93
N.J. Super. 351, 225 A.2d 742 (1966); Tobin v. Grossman, 291 N.Y.S.2d 227 (1968); Berg
v. Baum, 224 N.Y.S.2d 974 (1962); Nuckles v. Tennessee Electric Power Co, 155 Tenn.
611, 299 S.W. 775 (1927).
7. See, e.g., Redding v. United States, 196 F. Supp. 871 (W.D. Ark. 1961); Tyler v.

